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SEA POWER IS WORLD POWER
An article by

Commander George H. Miller, U. S. Navy
As the United States stands on the threshold of what may one
day be known as her Golden Age it might be well for us to look back
over the road which has led our country to its present position of

world leadership. Today we are the most powerful nation on earth,

and there is little doubt that much of the credit for this growth can
be laid to our fortunate geographic position. Situated between

two great oceans, the United States is unmistakably a maritime
power. Our forefathers, who crossed the seas to found our na
tion, were seafaring people.

They derived their living from the
sea, and it is because of the sea that our nation grew and pros
pered. The seas have given us security and economic stability,
and these two elements are wholly related, one to the other.

As we grew, we enjoyed the tacit protection of the British
Navy. And it was because of the maternalistic attitude, and pos
sibly the preoccupation, of the British that we were permitted to

use the seas without having to pay our way. In other words we
were given a free ride by the British Navy. For example, we pro
pounded the Monroe Doctrine and were able, by obtaining the sup
port of the British, to make it stick. Later we built a great fleet of

clipper ships without having to bear the expense of a huge navy to

protect them. In World War I, we were able to fight an overseas
war chiefly because the British Fleet was there to run interference
for us.

Between World War I and World War II we were able to
build a tactical navy designed to defeat the Japanese Fleet in a
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fleet action.

During. this period all our talent was devoted to the

problem of defeating the Japanese Fleet in the Pacific, while in

the Atlantic our thinking went very little beyond the Neutrality
Patrol.

As for the rest -of the world, we let the British worry

about that;

So lo:p.g as the British looked out for things else-

where we did not have to think seriously about problems pf maritime
strategy--or global strategy.

Thus our navy was a tactical navy, superbly trained and,

we believed, ready to fight. Fleet training and fleet readiness were
given top priority.

They were our primary· objectives in our peace-

time training for war.

Today we face a different situation..

The British are un

able to carry their former share of the load.

We in the United

States are finding it necessary to assume more and more of the

responsibility for world stability.

And so if anyone is going to

do any serious thinking about the uses and implications of sea
power it must be the United States.

It is because of our unchallenged position as the dominant

sea power that we are today the greatest power on the face of

the earth. It is because of this control of the seas that we are
able to exert our influence in most of the important areas of the

earth. And in case of war sea power places at our disposal most

of the resources, the populations, and the industrial capacity of the
world. We need only look at the Globe to remind ourselves that

wherever the oceans touch the shores, the United States exerts a
powerful influence for world stability. Consequently, so long as

we control the seas, our frontiers, unlike those of a land power, lie
acrqss the seas rather than at our own borders.
Now we are witnessing an amazing paradox.

Here is a na
tion, born and brought up by the sea, a nation which is today one
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of the greatest sea powers the world has ever known; and her
people are beginning to forget it. Why has this happened?
One reason for this apparent confusion of thought is the
fact that we are in the midst of an industrial revolution. In the
last hundred years, civilization has advanced further in the techni
cal field than it has in all previous recorded history. We have

moved so fast that our military thinking has not been able to
keep pace with the development of new weapons. We are tend
ing to become so preoccupied with the technical aspects of warfare
that our strategic thinking suffers.
In the midst of this technical advance, we find the British

forced to relinquish their position as the dominant sea power. We
in the Navy were just not ready for the task that was thereby

handed to us. Up to this time, we had always been a tactical
Navy, free to occupy ourselves with our own little problems, while
the British worried about the rest of the world. Fleet training

and fleet readiness have always taken priority over higher education

in naval strategy. As a result, we do not have in our Navy or
in our country today any sizeable group of recognized naval
strategists. We have never really needed these strategic thinkers
until now; and we just do not have them.
We have a wealth of technical experts who have no equal
in any other nation. We have aviation specialists, amphibious
specialists, submarine specialists, anti-submarine specialists, atomic
energy specialists, and electronic specialists, but we just do not have
enough people with a clear understanding of sea power and mari
time strategy. Without such understanding these many elements of
military power cannot be properly integrated into a pattern of
national security.
Along with our rapid technical development there has grown
up among our people a sincere desire to turn from considerations
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of national security to the more constructive pursuits of peace.

There has been a natural tendency to look around for a simple

formula by which our national security problems could be solved.

Some have suggested that the simple solution to our problem lies

in the large-scale use of the atomic bomb.

We recognize in this

proposal the theory of the blitzkrieg, the quick, easy victory idea,
that has always seemed so attractive to the uninformed.

It is

the old land-power concept of the "putsch", which depends so
much on being able to obtain the quick surrender of the enemy.

But if the enemy fails to surrender according to plan, the blitz

krieg fails, and the attacker is faced with a totally different kind of

a war, a kind for which he is not prepared. He finds himself fight

ing the kind of war the enemy wants to fight, and the result in
this case could very well be final defeat.

And thus today we are attempting to solve our national se,.

curity problems through poorly conceived concepts, rather than
through a clear understanding of geography and strategy.

We as

a nation are attempting to ignore the very existence of three

quarters of the surface of the earth-the seas, by which we have

grown to our present position of world power.

The truth of the matter is that we in the Armed Forces have

stood by while these unsound concepts were being pressed.

We

simply did not have the people who understood the significance

J

of the seas to our national life well enough to spell it out for the
American people.

We can go even one step further.

In some instances, we in

l'l

the Navy have helped promote these false concepts. During the con

fusion that followed the initial use of atomic weapons, there were
those in our own service who came forward to assert that from now

on wars would be fought exclusively below the surface of the seas,

or in the skies.

And there was one of our wartime captains who is
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reputed to have said, "I am retiring because there is no longer
any need for a navy."

As a result of our failure to keep our thinking abreast of

new developments the American people are beginning to lose sight

of the vital significance of the sea areas of the world to their na

tional security and prosperity. There is a growing tendency to turn

from the sea and to accept the far more costly security measures
peculiar to land powers.

Some current concepts, instead of wel

coming and exploiting to the fullest the free, easy road of the sea,
seek to avoid its use.

Yet, by the very facts of geography we are
a maritime power. To reach the rest of the world in peace or in
war, we must first cross the seas; for others to reach us they, too,
must first cross the seas.

In peace and in war the maritime power holds a tremendous

•

-

economic advantage over the land power.

The significant phen

and float it on the surface of the water;

It floats by itself; it

omenon of sea power is that we can build a huge tub, or hull,
requires no power to keep it afloat.

This huge tub can be filled

with cargo-or bombs, or airplanes, or soldiers-and with relatively

little power can be moved to almost any point on the surface of the

earth.

There are no rail or road beds to maintain, no mountains to

cross, no tunnels to dig. And as our civilization continues to de

velop more ways will be found to use this cheap, easy road of the
sea.

Water transportation is by far the most economical means
By conservative estimate it is

of transportation known to Man.

two times as economical as land transportation and thirty-four times
as economical as air transportation. To take a specific example,

one oil company estimates that it costs twenty times as much to
transport petroleum products by rail as it does by water. Thus the

cost of transporting petroleum products by air would be over three

...
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hundred times the cost by water. When we realize that our overseas
transportation during five years of the past war amounted to ap

proximately 676 billion ton-miles and that about two thirds of this
total consisted of petroleum products we can readily see the eco

nomic advantage of gearing our war and peacetime transportation
to the sea.

War is fundamentally a problem of transportation, the prob
lem of transporting weapons-whether they be in the form of

bombs, projectiles or bayonets-to the point where they will exert

the greatest influence on the enemy. It would therefore seem pru

dent that we plan, in the event of war, to transport our weapons

as close as possible to our objective by sea, shifting to more expen

sive means of transportation only when sufficient resistance de
velops to prevent further movement by water.

air

By projecting our

forces and ground forces at the end of sea lines of communica

tion a smaller percentage of the national wealth is expended for

transportation.

For every dollar expended for our military estab

lishment we would thereby assure ourselves of more hitting power
at the point of contact with the enemy.

In order to assure our

selves of the tremendous advantages inherent in water transporta

tion it therefore seems reasonable that our primary

national

jective in peace or in war is to maintain control of the seas.

ob

Any

threat to this control should be considered as the major threat to
our national security.

What steps are we taking to clarify our thinking on the

subject of sea power?

Even today there are few in our Navy, or

in the country at large, who see the critical need for a serious

study of sea power and naval strategy.

There are few who real-

. ize that a basic understanding of sea power is a matter of grave
concern to every citizen of the United States. For the day we as a
nation relinquish our supremacy on the seas is the day we begin
our decline.
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Today there are relatively fe:w in the Navy who fully un
derstand the implications of sea power. Before we can carry this
message to the other services and to the people of the United
States we must first educate ourselves. Unless the study of sea
power is pursued vigorously and continuously with the best minds
available in the country we cannot expect to maintain our dominat
ing position in the world. This is a matter of immediate concern
to the people of the United States. The best talent and the best
equipment in the country must be made available to work on the
problem of maintaining our position on the seas.
The study of sea power and naval strategy is an under
taking that should be given the highest priority. It is a project as
urgent as the study and development of anti-submarine warfare,
guided missiles, or atomic energy. Unless our strategic thinking
is the best in the world all the new weapons we are developing can
not save us.
The case for sea power was never so strong as it is today.
It is the single factor governing our present position as a World
Power. The implications of sea power for our future go far beyond
anything we can now comprehend. We in the Navy must be the
first to recognize and understand this fact.
We Americans might also remind ourselves that it is not in
evitable that the United States maintain indefinitely her present
position of world supremacy; we are not immune to decadence. For
even though our scientific progress has been nothing short of re
markable, we are not a race of supermen. Nor are we specially en
dowed with some supernatural immunity from human error. We as
a nation are vulnerable to the same error, the same pitfalls as are
other communities of human beings.
7
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History is filled with the epitaphs of nations which, though

blessed with favorable maritime positions, chose to turn their backs
on the sea. We hold in our own hands the destiny of our country;

and in our minds lay the seeds of our own destruction. The quality
of our strategic thinking today may well deter�ine whether the

life of these United States will be measured in centuries-or in

decades.
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